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Abstract
This paper investigates the visual quality of the adver-
sarial examples. Recent papers propose to smooth the per-
turbations to get rid of high frequency artefacts. In this
work, smoothing has a different meaning as it perceptually
shapes the perturbation according to the visual content of
the image to be attacked. The perturbation becomes locally
smooth on the flat areas of the input image, but it may be
noisy on its textured areas and sharp across its edges.
This operation relies on Laplacian smoothing, well-
known in graph signal processing, which we integrate in
the attack pipeline. We benchmark several attacks with and
without smoothing under a white-box scenario and evalu-
ate their transferability. Despite the additional constraint
of smoothness, our attack has the same probability of suc-
cess at lower distortion.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples where introduced by Szegedy et
al. [34] as imperceptible perturbations of a test image that
can change a neural network’s prediction. This has spawned
active research on adversarial attacks and defenses with
competitions among research teams [17]. Despite the theo-
retical and practical progress in understanding the sensitiv-
ity of neural networks to their input, assessing the impercep-
tibility of adversarial attacks remains elusive: user studies
show that Lp norms are largely unsuitable, whereas more
sophisticated measures are limited too [30].
Machine assessment of perceptual similarity between
two images (the input image and its adversarial example) is
arguably as difficult as the original classification task, while
human assessment of whether one image is adversarial is
hard when the Lp norm of the perturbation is small. Of
course, when both images are available and the perturba-
tion is isolated, one can always see it. To make the prob-
lem interesting, we ask the following question: given a sin-
gle image, can the effect of a perturbation be magnified to
the extent that it becomes visible and a human may decide
whether this example is benign or adversarial?
Figure 1 shows that the answer is positive for a range of
popular adversarial attacks. In Appendix A we propose a
(a) Original image (b) Original, magnified
(c) C&W [1] (d) sC&W (this work)
(e) DeepFool [24] (f) Universal [23]
(g) FGSM [6] (h) I-FGSM [15]
Figure 1. Given a single input image, our adversarial magnifica-
tion (cf . Appendix A) reveals the effect of a potential adversarial
perturbation. We show (a) the original image followed by (b) its
own magnified version as well as (c)-(h) magnified versions of
adversarial examples generated by different attacks. Our smooth
adversarial example (d) is invisible even when magnified.
simple adversarial magnification producing a “magnified”
version of a given image, without the knowledge of any
other reference image. Assuming that natural images are
locally smooth, this can reveal not only the existence of an
adversarial perturbation but also its pattern. One can rec-
ognize, for instance, the pattern of Fig. 4 of [23] in our
Fig. 1(f), revealing a universal adversarial perturbation.
Motivated by this example, we argue that popular ad-
versarial attacks have a fundamental limitation in terms of
imperceptibility that we attempt to overcome by introduc-
ing smooth adversarial examples. Our attack assumes local
smoothness and generates examples that are consistent with
the precise smoothness pattern of the input image. More
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than just looking “natural” [37] or being smooth [10, 8],
our adversarial examples are photorealistic, low-distortion,
and virtually invisible even under magnification. This is ev-
ident by comparing our magnified example in Fig. 1(d) to
the magnified original in Fig. 1(b).
Given that our adversarial examples are more con-
strained, an interesting question is whether they perform
well according to metrics like probability of success and Lp
distortion. We show that our attack is not only competitive
but outperforms Carlini & Wagner [1], from which our own
attack differs basically by a smoothness penalty.
Contributions. As primary contributions, we
1. investigate the behavior of existing attacks when per-
turbations become “smooth like” the input image; and
2. devise one attack that performs well on standard met-
rics while satisfying the new constraint.
As secondary contributions, we
3. magnify perturbations to facilitate qualitative evalua-
tion of their imperceptibility; and
4. define a new, more complete/fair evaluation protocol.
The remaining text is organized as follows. Section 2
formulates the problem and introduces a classification of
attacks. It describes the C&W attack and the related work.
Section 3 explains Laplacian smoothing, on which we build
our method. Section 4 presents our smooth adversarial at-
tacks, and section 5 provides experimental evaluation. Con-
clusions are drawn section 6. Our adversarial magnification
used to generate Fig. 1 is specified in Appendix A.
2. Problem formulation and related work
Let us denote by x ∈ X := [0, 1]n×d an image of n
pixels and d color channels that has been flattened in a given
ordering of the spatial components. A classifier network f
maps that input image x to an output y = f(x) ∈ Rk which
contains the logits of k classes. It is typically followed by
softmax and cross-entropy loss at supervised training or by
arg max at test time. An input x with logits y = f(x) is
correctly classified if the prediction p(x) := arg maxi yi
equals the true label of x.
The attacker mounts a white-box attack that is specific
to f, public and known. The attack modifies an original
image xo ∈ X with given true label t ∈ {1, . . . , k} into
an adversarial example xa ∈ X , which may be incorrectly
classified by the network, that is p(xa) 6= t, although it
looks similar to the original xo. The latter is often expressed
by a small L2 distortion ‖xa − xo‖.
2.1. Families of attacks
In a white box setting, attacks typically rely on exploiting
the gradient of some loss function. We propose to classify
known attacks into three families.
Target Distortion. This family gathers attacks targeting a
distortion  given as an input parameter. Examples are early
attacks like Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] and
Iterative-FGSM (I-FGSM) [15]. Their performance is then
measured by the probability of success Psuc := P(p(xa) 6=
t) as a function of .
Target Success. This family gathers attacks that always
succeed in misclassifying xa, at the price of a possible
large distortion. DeepFool [24] is a typical example. Their
performance is then measured by the expected distortion
D := E(‖xa − xo‖).
These two first families are implemented with variations
of a gradient descent method. A classification loss function
is defined on an output logit vector y = f(x) with respect
to the original true label t, denoted by `(y, t).
Target Optimality. The above attacks are not optimal be-
cause they a priori do not solve the problem of succeeding
under minimal distortion,
min
x∈X :p(x) 6=t
‖x− xo‖. (1)
Szegedy et al. [34] approximate this constrained minimiza-
tion problem by a Lagrangian formulation
min
x∈X
λ ‖x− xo‖2 + `(f(x), t). (2)
Parameter λ controls the trade-off between the distortion
and the classification loss. Szegedy et al. [34] carry out this
optimization by box-constrained L-BFGS.
The attack of Carlini & Wagner [1], denoted C&W in
the sequel, pertains to this approach. A change of variable
eliminates the box constraint: x ∈ X is replaced by σ(w),
where w ∈ Rn×d and σ is the element-wise sigmoid func-
tion. A margin is introduced: an untargeted attack makes
the logit yt less than any other logit yi for i 6= t by at least
a margin m ≥ 0. Similar to the multi-class SVM loss by
Crammer and Singer [4] (where m = 1), the loss function `
is then defined as
`(y, t) := [yt −max
i6=t
yi +m]+, (3)
where [·]+ denotes the positive part. The C&W attack uses
the Adam optimizer [14] to minimize the functional
J(w, λ) := λ ‖σ(w)− xo‖2 + `(f(σ(w)), t). (4)
When the margin is reached, loss `(y, t) (3) vanishes and
the distortion term pulls σ(w) back towards xo, causing os-
cillations around the margin. Among all successful iterates,
the one with the least distortion is kept; if there is none,
the attack fails. The process is repeated for different La-
grangian multiplier λ according to line search. This family
of attacks is typically more expensive than the two first.
2.2. Imperceptibility of adversarial perturbations
Adversarial perturbations are often invisible only be-
cause their amplitude is extremely small. Few papers deal
with the need of improving the imperceptibility of the ad-
versarial perturbations. The main idea in this direction is to
create low or mid-frequency perturbation patterns.
Zhou et al. [40] add a regularization term for the sake of
transferability, which removes the high frequencies of the
perturbation via low-pass spatial filtering. Heng et al. [10]
propose a harmonic adversarial attack where perturbations
are very smooth gradient-like images. Guo et al. [8] design
an attack explicitly in the Fourier domain. However, in all
cases above, the convolution and the bases of the harmonic
functions and of the Fourier transform are independent of
the visual content of the input image.
In contrast, the adversarial examples in this work are
crafted to be locally compliant with the smoothness of the
original image. Our perturbation may be sharp across the
edges of xo but smooth wherever xo is, e.g. on background
regions. It is not just smooth but photorealistic, because its
smoothness pattern is guided by the input image.
An analogy becomes evident with digital watermark-
ing [28]. In this application, the watermark signal pushes
the input image into the detection region (the set of images
deemed as watermarked by the detector), whereas here the
adversarial perturbation drives the image outside its class
region. The watermark is invisible thanks to the mask-
ing property of the input image [3]. Its textured areas and
its contours can hide a lot of watermarking power, but the
flat areas can not be modified without producing noticeable
artefacts. Perceptually shaping the watermark signal allows
a stronger power, which in turn yields more robustness.
Another related problem, with similar solutions mathe-
matically, is photorealistic style transfer. Luan et al. [22]
transfer style from a reference style image to an input im-
age, while constraining the output to being photorealistic
with respect to the input. This work as well as follow-up
works [27, 20] are based on variants of Laplacian smooth-
ing or regularization much like we do.
It is important to highlight that high frequencies can be
powerful for deluding a network, as illustrated by the ex-
treme example of the one pixel attack [32]. However this is
arguably one of the most visible attacks.
3. Background on graph Laplacian smoothing
Popular attacks typically produce noisy patterns that are
not found in natural images. They may not be visible at
first sight because of their low amplitude, but they are easily
detected once magnified (see Fig. 1). Our objective is to
craft an adversarial perturbation that is locally as smooth as
the input image, remaining invisible through magnification.
This section gives background on Laplacian smoothing [38,
13], a classical operator in graph signal processing [29, 31],
which we adapt to images here. Section 4 uses it generate a
smooth perturbation guided by the original input image.
Graph. Laplacian smoothing builds on a weighted undi-
rected graph whose n vertices correspond to the n pixels of
the input image xo. The i-th vertex of the graph is associ-
ated with feature xi ∈ [0, 1]d that is the i-th row of xo, that
is, xo = [x1, . . . ,xn]>. Matrix p ∈ Rn×2 denotes the spa-
tial coordinates of the n pixels in the image, and similarly
p = [p1, . . . ,pn]
>. An edge (i, j) of the graph is associ-
ated with weight wij ≥ 0, giving rise to an n×n symmetric
adjacency matrix W, for instance defined as
wij :=
{
kf(xi,xj)ks(pi,pj), if i 6= j
0, if i = j
(5)
for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where kf is a feature kernel and ks
is a spatial kernel, both being usually Gaussian or Lapla-
cian. The spatial kernel is typically nonzero only on nearest
neighbors, resulting in a sparse matrix W. We further de-
fine the n × n degree matrix D := diag(W1n) where 1n
is the all-ones n-vector.
Regularization [38]. Now, given a new signal z ∈ Rn×d
on this graph, the objective of graph smoothing is to find the
output signal sα(z) := arg minr∈Rn×d φα(r, z) with
φα(r, z) :=
α
2
∑
i,j
wij ‖rˆi − rˆj‖2 +(1−α) ‖r− z‖2F (6)
where rˆ := D−1/2r and ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm. The
first summand is the smoothness term. It encourages rˆi to
be close to rˆj when wij is large, i.e. when pixels i and j
of input xo are neighbours and similar. This encourages r
to be smooth wherever xo is. The second summand is the
fitness term that encourages r to stay close to z. Parameter
α ∈ [0, 1) controls the trade-off between the two.
Filtering. If we symmetrically normalize matrix W as
W := D−1/2WD−1/2 and define the n × n regularized
Laplacian matrix Lα := (In − αW)/(1− α), then the ex-
pression (6) simplifies to the following quadratic form:
φα(r, z) = (1− α) tr
(
r>Lαr− 2z>r+ z>z
)
. (7)
This reveals, by letting the derivative ∂φ/∂r vanish inde-
pendently per column, that the smoothed signal is simply:
sα(z) = L−1α z. (8)
This is possible because matrix Lα is positive-definite. Pa-
rameter α controls the bandwidth of the smoothing: func-
tion sα is the all-pass filter for α = 0 and becomes a strict
‘low-pass’ filter when α→ 1 [11].
Variants of the model above have been used for instance
for interactive image segmentation [7, 13, 36], transduc-
tive semi-supervised classification [41, 38], and ranking on
manifolds [39, 12]. Input z expresses labels known for
some input pixels (for segmentation) or samples (for classi-
fication), or identifies queries (for ranking), and is null for
the remaining vertices. Smoothing then spreads the labels
to these vertices according the weights of the graph.
Normalization. Contrary to applications like interactive
segmentation or semi-supervised classification [38, 13], z
does not represent a binary labeling but rather an arbitrary
perturbation in this work. Also contrary to such applica-
tions, the output is neither normalized nor taken as the max-
imum over feature dimensions (channels). If L−1α is seen as
a spatial filter, we therefore row-wise normalize it to one in
order to preserve the dynamic range of z:
sˆα(z) := diag(sα(1n))
−1sα(z). (9)
The normalized smoothing function sˆα of course depends on
xo. We omit this from notation but we say sˆα is smoothing
guided by xo and the output is smooth like xo.
4. Integrating smoothness into the attack
The key idea of the paper is that the smoothness of the
perturbation is now consistent with the smoothness of the
original input image xo, which is achieved by smoothing
operations guided by xo. This section integrates smooth-
ness into attacks targeting distortion (section 4.1) and at-
tacks targeting optimality (section 2.1).
4.1. Simple attacks
We consider here simple attacks targeting distortion or
success based on gradient descent of the loss function.
There are many variations which normalize or clip the up-
date according to the norm used for measuring the distor-
tion, a learning rate or a fixed step etc. These variants are
loosely prototyped as the iterative process
g = ∇x`(f(x(k)a ), t), (10)
x(k+1)a = c
(
x(k)a − n(g)
)
, (11)
where c is a clipping function and n a normalization func-
tion according to the variant. Function c should at least pro-
duce a valid image: c(x) ∈ X = [0, 1]n×d.
Quick and dirty. To keep these simple attacks simple,
smoothness is loosely integrated after the gradient compu-
tation and before the update normalization:
x(k+1)a = c
(
x(k)a − n(ˆsα(g))
)
. (12)
This approach can be seen as a projected gradient descent
on the manifold of perturbations that are smooth like xo.
4.2. Attack targeting optimality
This section integrates smoothness in the attacks target-
ing optimality like C&W. Our starting point is the uncon-
strained problem (4) [1]. However, instead of representing
the perturbation signal r := x− xo implicitly as a function
σ(w) − xo of another parameter w, we express the objec-
tive explicitly as a function of variable r, as in the original
formulation of (2) in [34]. We make this choice because we
need to directly process the perturbation r independently of
xo. On the other hand, we now need the element-wise clip-
ping function c(x) := min([x]+, 1) to satisfy the constraint
x = xo + r ∈ X (2). Our problem is then
min
r
λ ‖r‖2 + `(f(c(xo + r)), t), (13)
where r is unconstrained in Rn×d.
Smoothness penalty. At this point, optimizing (13) results
in ‘independent’ updates at each pixel. We would rather
like to take the smoothness structure of the input xo into
account and impose a similar structure on r. Representing
the pairwise relations by a graph as discussed in section 3,
a straightforward choice is to introduce a pairwise loss term
µ
∑
i,j
wij ‖rˆi − rˆj‖2 (14)
into (13), where we recall that wij are the elements of
the adjacency matrix W of xo, rˆ := D−1/2r and D :=
diag(W1n). A problem is that the spatial kernel is typi-
cally narrow to capture smoothness only locally. Even if
parameter µ is large, it would take a lot of iterations for the
information to propagate globally, each iteration needing a
forward and backward pass through the network.
Smoothness constraint. What we advocate instead is to
apply a global smoothing process at each iteration: we in-
troduce a latent variable z ∈ Rn×d and seek for a joint
solution with respect to r and z of the following
min
r,z
µφα(r, z) + λ ‖r‖2 + `(f(c(xo + r)), t), (15)
where φ is defined by (6). In words, z represents an uncon-
strained perturbation, while r should be close to z, smooth
like xo, small, and such that the perturbed input xo + r sat-
isfies the classification objective. Then, by letting µ → ∞,
the first term becomes a hard constraint imposing a globally
smooth solution at each iteration:
min
r,z
λ ‖r‖2 + `(f(c(xo + r)), t) (16)
subject to r = sˆα(z), (17)
where sˆα is defined by (9). During optimization, every iter-
ate of this perturbation r is smooth like xo.
Optimization. With this definition in place, we solve for z
the following unconstrained problem over Rn×d:
min
z
λ ‖sˆα(z)‖2 + `(f(c(xo + sˆα(z))), t). (18)
Observe that this problem has the same form as (13), where
r has been replaced by sˆα(z). This implies that we can use
the same optimization method as the C&W attack. The only
difference is that the variable is z, which we initialize by
z = 0n×d, and we apply function sˆα at each iteration.
Gradients are easy to compute because our smoothing is
a linear operator. We denote the loss on this new variable
by L(z) := `(f(c(xo + sˆα(z))), t). Its gradient is
∇zL(z) = Jsˆα(z)> · ∇x`(f(c(xo + sˆα(z))), t), (19)
where Jsˆα(z) is the n × n Jacobian matrix of the smooth-
ing operator at z. Since our smoothing operator as defined
by (8) and (9) is linear, Jsˆα(z) = diag(sα(1n))
−1L−1α is
a matrix constant in z, and multiplication by this matrix is
equivalent to smoothing. The same holds for the distortion
penalty ‖sˆα(z)‖2. This means that in the backward pass,
the gradient of the objective (18) w.r.t. z is obtained from
the gradient w.r.t. r (or x) by smoothing, much like how r
is obtained from z in the forward pass (17).
Matrix Lα is fixed during optimization, depending
only on input xo. For small images like in the MNIST
dataset [18], it can be inverted: function sˆα is really a ma-
trix multiplication. For larger images, we use the conjugate
gradient (CG) method [25] to solve the set of linear systems
Lαr = z for r given z. Again, this is possible because ma-
trix Lα is positive-definite, and indeed it is the most com-
mon solution in similar problems [7, 2, 12]. At each itera-
tion, one computes a product of the form v 7→ Lαv, which
is efficient because Lα is sparse. In the backward pass,
one can either use CG on the gradient, or auto-differentiate
through the forward CG iterations. These options have the
same complexity. We choose the latter.
Discussion. The clipping function c that we use is just the
identity over the interval [0, 1] but outside this interval its
derivative is zero. Carlini & Wagner [1] therefore argue that
the numerical solver of problem (13) suffers from getting
stuck in flat spots: when a pixel of the perturbed input xo +
r falls outside [0, 1], it keeps having zero derivative after
that and with no chance of returning to [0, 1] even if this is
beneficial. This limitation does not apply to our case thanks
to the L2 distortion penalty in (13) and to the updates in its
neighborhood: such a value may return to [0, 1] thanks to
the smoothing operation.
5. Experiments
Our experiments focus on the white-box setting, where
the defender first exhibits a network, and then the attacker
Table 1. Success probability Psuc and average L2 distortion D.
MNIST ImageNet
C4 InceptionV3 ResNetV2
Psuc D Psuc D Psuc D
FGSM 0.89 5.02 0.97 5.92 0.92 8.20
I-FGSM 1.00 2.69 1.00 5.54 0.99 7.58
PGD2 1.00 1.71 1.00 1.80 1.00 3.63
C&W 1.00 2.49 0.99 4.91 0.99 9.84
sPGD2 0.97 3.36 0.96 2.10 0.93 4.80
sC&W 1.00 1.97 0.99 3.00 0.98 5.99
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Figure 2. Operating characteristics of the attacks over MNIST.
Attacks PGD2 and sPGD2 are tested with target distortion D ∈
[1, 6].
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Figure 3. Operating characteristics over ImageNet attacking Incep-
tionV3 (solid lines) and ResNetV2-50 (dotted lines).
mounts an attack specific to this network; but we also inves-
tigate a transferability scenario. All attacks are untargetted,
as defined by loss function (3).
5.1. Evaluation protocol
We evaluate the strength of an attack by two global statis-
tics and by an operating characteristic curve. Given a test
image set ofN ′ images, we only consider its subsetX ofN
images that are classified correctly without any attack. The
accuracy of the classifier is N/N ′. Let Xsuc be the subset
(a) original image C&W: D=3.64 sC&W: D= 4.59 PGD2: D=2.77 sPGD2: D=5.15
(b) original image C&W: D=6.55 sC&W: D= 4.14 PGD2: D=2.78 sPGD2: D=2.82
(c) original image C&W: D=6.55 sC&W: D= 10.32 PGD2: D=2.77 sPGD2: D=31.76
Figure 4. Original image xo (left), adversarial image xa = xo + r (above) and scaled perturbation r (below; distortion D = ‖r‖) against
InceptionV3 on ImageNet. Scaling maps each perturbation and each color channel independently to [0, 1]. The perturbation r is indeed
smooth like xo for sC&W. (a) Despite the higher distortion compared to C&W, the perturbation of sC&W is totally invisible, even when
magnified (cf . Fig. 1). (b) One of the failing examples of [10] that look unnatural to human vision. (c) One of the examples with the
strongest distortion over ImageNet for sC&W: xo is flat along stripes, reducing the dimensionality of the ‘smooth like xo’ manifold.
of X with Nsuc := |Xsuc| where the attack succeeds and let
D(xo) := ‖xa−xo‖ be the distortion for image xo ∈ Xsuc.
The global statistics are the success probability Psuc and
expected distortion D as defined in section 2, estimated by
Psuc =
Nsuc
N
, D =
1
Nsuc
∑
xo∈Xsuc
D(xo), (20)
with the exception that D here is the conditional average
distortion, where conditioning is on success. Indeed, dis-
tortion makes no sense for a failure.
If Dmax = maxxo∈Xsuc D(xo) is the maximum distor-
tion, the operating characteristic function P : [0, Dmax]→
[0, 1] measures the probability of success as a function of a
given upper bound D on distortion. For D ∈ [0, Dmax],
P(D) :=
1
N
|{xo ∈ Xsuc : D(xo) ≤ D}|. (21)
This function increases from P(0) = 0 to P(Dmax) = Psuc.
It is difficult to define a fair comparison of distortion tar-
geting attacks to optimality targeting attacks. For the first
family, we run a given attack several times over the test
set with different target distortion . The attack succeeds
on image xo ∈ X if it succeeds on any of the runs. For
xo ∈ Xsuc, the distortion D(xo) is the minimum distortion
over all runs. All statistics are then evaluated as above.
5.2. Datasets, networks, and attacks
MNIST [19]. We consider a simple convolutional network
with three convolutional layers and one fully connected
layer that we denote as C4, giving accuracy 0.99. In de-
tail, the first convolutional layer has 64 features, kernel of
size 8 and stride 2; the second layer has 128 features, kernel
of size 6 and stride 2; the third has also 128 features, but
kernel of size 5 and stride 1.
ImageNet. We use the dataset of the NIPS 2017 adversar-
ial competition [16], comprising 1,000 images from Ima-
geNet [5]. We use InceptionV3 [33] and ResNetV2-50 [9]
networks, with accuracy 0.96 and 0.93 respectively.
Attacks. The following six attacks are benchmarked:
• L∞ distortion: FGSM [6] and I-FGSM [15].
• L2 distortion: an L2 version of I-FGSM [26], denoted
as PGD2 (projected gradient descent).
• Optimality: The L2 version of C&W [1].
• Smooth: our smooth versions sPGD2 of PGD2
(sect. 4.1) and sC&W of C&W (sect. 4.2).
Parameters. On MNIST, we use  = 0.3 for FGSM;
 = 0.3, α = 0.08 for I-FGSM;  = 5, α = 3 for
PGD2; confidence margin m = 1, learning rate η = 0.1,
and initial constant c = 15 (the inverse of λ in (4)) for
C&W. For smoothing, we use Laplacian feature kernel, set
α = 0.95, and pre-compute L−1α . On ImageNet, we use
 = 0.1255 for FGSM;  = 0.1255, α = 0.08 for I-FGSM;
 = 5, α = 3 for PGD2; m = 0, η = 0.1, and c = 100 for
C&W. For smoothing, we use Laplacian feature kernel, set
α = 0.997, and use 50 iterations of CG. These settings are
used in sect. 5.4.
5.3. White box scenario
The global statistics Psuc, D are shown in Table 1. Oper-
ating characteristics over MNIST and ImageNet are shown
in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.
We observe that our sC&W, with the proper integration
via a latent variable (18), improves a lot the original C&W
in terms of distortion, while keeping the probability of suc-
cess roughly the same. This is surprising. We would expect
a price to be paid for a better invisibility as the smoothing
is adding an extra constraint on the perturbation. All results
clearly show the opposite. On the contrary, the ‘quick and
dirty’ integration (12) dramatically spoils sPGD2 with big
distortion especially on MNIST. This reveals that attacks
behave in different ways under the new constraint.
We further observe that PGD2 outperforms by a vast
margin C&W, which is supposed to be close to optimal-
ity. This may be due in part to how the Adam optimizer
treats L2 norm penalties as studied in [21]. C&W internally
optimizes its parameter c = 1/λ independently per image,
while for PGD2 we externally try a small set of target distor-
tionsD on the entire dataset. This is visible in Fig. 2, where
the operating characteristic is piecewise constant. This in-
teresting finding is a result of our new evaluation protocol.
Our comparison is fair, given that C&W is more expensive.
As already observed in the literature, ResnetV2 is more
robust than InceptionV3: the operating characteristic curves
are shifted to the right and increase at a slower rate.
To further understand the different behavior of C&W and
PGD2 under smoothness, Figures 5 and 4 show MNIST and
ImageNet examples respectively, focusing on worst cases.
Both sPGD2 and sC&W produce smooth perturbations that
look more natural. However, smoothing of sPGD2 is more
aggressive especially on MNIST, as these images contain
flat black or white areas. The perturbation update sˆα(g) is
then weakly correlated with gradient g, which is not effi-
cient to lower the classification loss. In natural images, ex-
cept for worst cases like Fig 4(c), the perturbation of sC&W
is totally invisible. The reason is the ‘phantom’ of the orig-
inal that is revealed when the perturbation is isolated.
Adversarial training. The defender now uses adversar-
ial training [6] to gain robustness against attacks. Yet,
the white-box scenario still holds: this network is public.
The training set comprises images attacked with “step l.l”
model [15]1. The accuracy of C4 over MNIST (resp. Incep-
tionV3 over ImageNet) is now 0.99 (resp. 0.94).
Table 2 shows interesting results. As expected, FGSM
is defeated in all cases, while average distortion of all at-
tacks is increased in general. What is unexpected is that
on MNIST, sC&W remains successful while the probability
of C&W drops. On ImageNet on the other hand, it is the
probability of the smooth versions sPGD2 and sC&W that
drops. I-FGSM is also defeated in this case, in the sense
that average distortion increases too much.
5.4. Transferability
This section investigates the transferability of the attacks
under the following scenario: the attacker has now a partial
knowledge about the network. For instance, he/she knows
that the defender chose a variant of InceptionV3, but this
1Model taken from: https://github.com/tensorflow/
models/tree/master/research/adv_imagenet_models
PGD2 * sPGD2 C&W sC&W
D=6.00 D=6.00 D=0.36 D=0.52
PGD2 sPGD2 * C&W sC&W
D=2.25 D=6.00 D=3.33 D=2.57
PGD2 sPGD2 C&W * sC&W
D=4.00 D=6.00 D=4.22 D=3.31
PGD2 sPGD2 C&W sC&W *
D=4.00 D=6.00 D=4.15 D=4.85
Figure 5. For a given attack (denoted by * and bold typeface), the
adversarial image with the strongest distortion D over MNIST. In
green, the attack succeeds; in red, it fails.
Table 2. Success probability and average L2 distortion D when
attacking networks adversarially trained against FGSM.
MNIST - C4 ImageNet - InceptionV3
Psuc D Psuc D
FGSM 0.15 4.53 0.06 6.40
I-FGSM 1.00 3.48 0.97 29.94
PGD2 1.00 2.52 1.00 3.89
C&W 0.93 3.03 0.95 6.43
sPGD2 0.99 2.94 0.69 7.86
sC&W 0.99 2.39 0.75 6.22
Table 3. Success probability and average L2 distortion D of at-
tacks on variants of InceptionV3 under transferability.
Bilateral filter Adv. training
Psuc D Psuc D
FGSM 0.77 5.13 0.04 10.20
I-FGSM 0.82 5.12 0.02 10.10
PGD2 1.00 5.14 0.12 10.26
C&W 0.82 4.75 0.02 10.21
sPGD2 0.95 5.13 0.01 10.17
sC&W 0.68 2.91 0.01 4.63
variant is not public so he/she attacks InceptionV3 instead.
Also, this time he/she is not allowed to test different distor-
tion targets. The results are shown in Table 3.
The first variant uses a bilateral filter (with standard de-
viation 0.5 and 0.2 in the domain and range kernel respec-
tively; cf . appendix A) before feeding the network. This
does not really prevent the attacks. PGD2 remains a very
powerful attack if the distortion is large enough. Smooth-
ing does not improve the statistics but the perturbations
are less visible. The second variant uses the adversarially
trained InceptionV3, which is, on the contrary, a very effi-
cient counter-measure under this scenario.
6. Conclusion
Smoothing helps mask the adversarial perturbation,
when it is ‘like’ the input image. It allows the attacker to de-
lude more robust networks thanks to larger distortions while
still being invisible. However, its impact on transferability
is mitigated. While clearly not every attack is improved by
such smoothing, which was not our objective, it is impres-
sive how sC&W improves upon C&W in terms of distortion
and imperceptibility at the same time.
The question raised in the introduction is still open:
Fig. 1 shows that a human does not make the difference
between the input image and its adversarial example even
with magnification. This does not prove that an algorithm
will not detect some statistical evidence.
A. Adversarial magnification
Given a single-channel image x : Ω → R as input, its
adversarial magnification mag(x) : Ω → R is defined as
the following local normalization operation
mag(x) :=
x− µx(x)
βσx(x) + (1− β)σΩ(x) , (22)
where µx(x) and σx(x) are the local mean and standard
deviation of x respectively, and σΩ(x) ∈ R+ is the global
standard deviation of x over Ω. Parameter β ∈ [0, 1] deter-
mines how much local variation is magnified in x.
In our implementation, µx(x) = b(x), the bilateral fil-
tering of x [35]. It applies a local kernel at each point p ∈ Ω
that is the product of a domain and a range Gaussian kernel.
The domain kernel measures the geometric proximity of ev-
ery point q ∈ Ω to p as a function of ‖p− q‖ and the range
kernel measures the photometric similarity of every point
q ∈ Ω to p as a function |x(p) − x(q)|. On the other hand,
σx(x) = bx((x− µx(x))2)−1/2, where bx is a guided ver-
sion of the bilateral filter, where it is the reference image x
rather than (x− µx(x))2 that is used in the range kernel.
When x : Ω→ Rd is a d-channel image, we apply all the
filters independently per channel, but photometric similarity
is just one scalar per point as a function of the Euclidean
distance ‖x(p)− x(q)‖ measured over all d channels.
In Fig. 1, β = 0.8. The standard deviation of both the
domain and range Gaussian kernels is 5.
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